A Simple and Secure E-Ticketing System for Intelligent Public Transportation based on NFC



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Outline

Introduction

System Description

Validation

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Intelligent Public Transportation and Urban Environment of the Future

 Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are going to shape the urban environment of the future

 Public transportation is an integral part of ITS





A Simple and Secure E-Ticketing System

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E-ticketing in Public Transportation



[Courtesy of MünsterscheZeitung.de]

The Notion of an E-ticket

- A digitalized version of a travel permission (e.g., a token)
- Stored on a user device:
 - Smart Card
 - NFC-enabled smart phone





Non-interactive vs. Interaction-based E-ticketing Systems

Non-interactive



Interaction-based



Non-interactive vs. Interaction-based E-ticketing Systems

Non-interactive



Interaction-based



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
Validation

Our Goal


- Providing a digital alternative to a conventional paper-based ticketing
- Based on open source components
- NFC-enabled smart phone as a user device



Many Cards – One Single App



System Main Actors



Core Processes Considered

(1) E-ticket acquisition:


- a) (online) via a Web interface
- b) *(offline)* via NFC with a vending machine

(2) E-ticket stamping:

a) *(offline)* via NFC with a stamping machine

(3) E-ticket validation

- a) *(offline)* via NFC with a checking machine
- \rightarrow The processes are implemented through corresponding protocols (see further)




Main Requirements

- 1. Open source components
- 2. Offline stamping and checking (as opposed to vending)
- 3. Ticket unforgeability
- 4. Protection from replay attacks
- 5. Ticket unclonability
- 6. Double spending prevention
- 7. Timing (especially for stamping and checking)


An E-ticket

- Essentially is a digital token
- Describes the acquired travel permission
- E-ticket is bound to the user's public key *PK*_u
- Different ticket types are supported through attributes
 - time-bounded (e.g., hourly tickets)
 - single ride
 - and many more...




Attributes
PK _u ID _{vm} Serial number Time limit Zone Price

Protocols: Vending




Protocols: Vending

- Actors: E-ticket app (EA) and
 a Vending machine (VM)
- Either online or offline
- EA requests a certain ticket type and sends user public key PK_u
- After payment, VM issues an e-ticket binding it to PK_u
- EA verifies the e-ticket




Protocols: Stamping




Protocols: Stamping

- Actors: E-ticket app (EA) a
 Stamping machine (SM)
- Offline
- Stamping essentially activates the e-ticket for a ride
- As a result, a stamp is obtained




Attributes	Description
Serial #	e-ticket number
Timestamp	stamping time
ID _{st}	station ID
ID_{sm}	SM ID.

Protocols: Stamping



Protocols: Checking



Protocols: Checking

- Performed between an E-ticket App and a Checking machine
- Follows similar pattern as the stamping protocol
- Up to the point where the previously obtained stamp is checked:
 - the e-ticket must be in stamped and valid state

Outline


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Practical Evaluation

- Terminal part:
 - NFC front-end: PN532 RFID/NFC Breakout Board
 - Controller and logic: Raspberry Pi Model b
- Customer device:
 - Samsung Galaxy Nexus GT-19250
 - Android 4.4 OS





Performance Figures and Demo

Ductocol	Execution time		
Protocol	RSA-1024	RSA-2048	
Vending	0.09 s	0.12 s	
Stamping	3.85 s	4.65 s	
Checking	3.33 s	4.23 s	

· And now a short demo is going to be presented

Conclusion

- The designed e-ticketing system has been presented
- It is based on open source components
- The first results of practical evaluation are feasible


Thank you very much for your attention! Do you have any questions/comments/suggestions?



Back up slides

What an E-Ticket is NOT

- A widely used "online ticket" (air transport, etc.)
- Pointing to the respective entry in the back-end DB



Adopted Attacker Model

(1) External attackers

- a) An observing attacker
- b) A modifying attacker (spoofing, masquerading)

(2) Internal attackers

- a) A user trying to forge/clone an e-ticket
- b) Vending machine issuing invalid e-tickets
- c) Stamping machine providing an incorrect stamp
- d) A conductor framing the user as having an invalid e-ticket

Protocols: Stamping (Detailed)

E-ticket app (EA) (PK_u, SK_u) , eticket		Stamping machine (SM) cert _{sm}
Generate random r_e	$r_e, PK_u \longrightarrow$	
		Generate random r_{sm}
		Create challenge: $chal \leftarrow (r_e r_{sm})$
		Encrypt <i>chal</i> under PK_u : $ce \leftarrow E_{PK_u}(chal)$
		Sign ce using cert _{sm} : $csign \leftarrow Sign_{cert_{sm}}(ce)$
	$\leftarrow ce, csign, cert_{sm}$	
Check <i>cert_{sm}</i> , check <i>csign</i>		
Decrypt <i>ce</i> , extract r'_{sm}		
Compute the answer: $ans \leftarrow h(r_{sm}^{'})$		
	ans, eticket	
		Check ans, check if <i>eticket</i> is bound to PK_u
		Create a signed stamp for the <i>eticket</i> :
		$(stamp, ss \leftarrow Sign_{cert_{sm}}(stamp))$
	stamp, ss	
Verify stamp and the signature ss		